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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
VIVIAN WIGGINS AND EMERSON D.
WIGGINS, DECEASED.
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)
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STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH & WELFARE,
Petitioner-Appellant,

v.
LYNN WIGGINS, personal representative of
THE ESTATE OF VIVIAN WIGGINS and
EMERSON D. WIGGINS,
Respondent.
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)
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)
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)
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ARGUMENT

I.
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE AGAIN CITES
"FACTS" THAT ARE NOT IN THE RECORD.
In Cross-Appellant's Reply Brief, the personal representative again refers to "facts" that

are completely unsupported in the record. At pages 1 and 2, the personal representative states:
... there must have been an agreement between Vivian and Emerson transmuting
their community property cash, equally, to their respective sole and separate
properties.

***

In the case at bar, both Emerson and Vivian owned an equal amount of money. as
separate property, after the transmutation. Also, both Emerson and Vivian were
competent to complete the transmutation and both ended up with an equal share of
their property after transmutation.

Cross-Appellant's Reply Brief, pp. 1-2 (underline added). The personal representative goes on to
again claim that the Department "participated" in the transmutation of the property, and uses that
"fact" in an attempt to distinguish this matter from the case of Idaho Department of Health &
Welfare v. McCormick, 2012 Opinion No. 118 (August 9, 2012). Cross-Appellant's Reply Brief,
pp.3-4. However, none of these "facts" are in any way supported by the record in this matter.
Nor is there anything in the law or rules that would presume such a state of affairs.
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H.
THE EXPANDED DEFINITION OF ESTATE IS NOT
LIMITED TO REAL PROPERTY.
The personal representative argues, for the first time, that the word "convey" in the
expanded definition of estate can only apply to transfers of real property, and does not apply to
transfers of money as occurred in this matter. "Issues not raised below but raised for the first
time on appeal will not be considered or reviewed." Krempasky v. Nez Perce County Planning

and Zoning, 150 Idaho 231, 236, 245 P.3d 983,988 (2010). This issue should not be considered
here.
To reach the conclusion that the expanded definition of estate only applies to real
property, the personal representative omits important parts ofthe controlling statute. At page 9
of Cross-Appell ant's Reply Brief he quotes 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4)(B)1 as follows:
"such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual
through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or
other arrangement."
(emphasis by personal representative). However, this quote is out of context and leaves out
important parts of the definition which, in whole, says:
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case
of an individual to whom paragraph (1 )(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to
a survivor, heir, or assign ofthe deceased individual through joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.

IThe personal representative incorrectly cites this section as 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(1)(4)(B) which does not
exist.
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42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (underline added). When the statute is read in context, it is clearly
using the word "convey" in a less formal sense than the personal representative suggests. By its
own terms, the definition includes "personal property and other assets."
The personal representative cites Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, for a formal
definition of "convey." However, like many other such terms, usages evolve over time. The
very next edition, the fifth edition of Black's Law Dictionary, published in 1979, contains a
broader definition of "convey" and omits the limitation for real property:
Convey. To transfer or deliver to another. To pass or transmit the title to
property from one to another. To transfer property or the title to property by deed,
bill of sale, or instrument under seal. Used popularly in sense of "assign", "sale,"
or "transfer".
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition. (underline added).
The personal representative has suggested no rational reason for limiting the expanded
definition of estate to real property, and by its own terms it clearly includes "personal property
and other assets."

III.

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & WELFARE V.
MCCORMICK IS DISPOSITIVE IN THIS CASE.
This court's recent decision in Idaho Department of Health & Welfare v. McCormick,
2012 Opinion No. 118 (August 9,2012) is dispositive in this case. In the McCormick matter, the
Medicaid recipient's community interest in her real property was purportedly conveyed to the
non-Medicaid spouse before death. Applying the federal definition of assets to the expanded
definition of estate, this Court held that the assets were recoverable regardless of which spouse
owned them at death:
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In light of the ambiguously inclusive nature of 42 U.S.C § 1396p(b)(4)(B) and the
plain definition of "assets" in 42 U.S.C. § 1396(h)(l), we cannot find that federal
law preempts the State from providing for recovery of assets from both spouses'
estates under I.e. § 56-218(1), including assets that were community propertY
during the marriage. * * * More specifically to the case at hand, because the
federal definition of "resources" includes the home for purposes of recovery, the
state is not precluded from staking a claim to the resource at issue here-the home
that was previously the community property of Martha and now rests in George's
estate. Therefore, the magistrate and district courts erred in disallowing that
claim. Because we find that the Department may reach the home, regardless of
which spouse owned it at death, we have no need to reach the remaining issue
regarding George's transfer via power of attorney.

***

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the district court erred in finding
that federal law preempted the Department's ability to recover from George's
estate what was once Martha's community property during the marriage.
McCormick, slip. op. at 14 (citations omitted; underline added). "Resources," of course, also

includes other assets such as the money at issue here. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1201.
IV.
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE HAS ADMITTED
THE ASSETS OF TillS ESTATE ARE TRACEABLE TO
THE COIJPLE'S COMMUNITY PROPERTY.

The personal representative contends that it would be an undue burden and "onerous and
time consuming" to trace assets such as those in this case. While this is a doubtful proposition
given these cases involve elderly couples of modest means, this is clearly not an issue in this
case. At page 7 of Respondent's Brief, the personal representative states, "In fact, the funds still
in existence are the funds transmuted to Emerson .... " Therefore, there is no issue as to the
traceability of the assets at issue in this estate.
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v.
CONCLUSION
The arguments presented in Cross-Appellant's Reply Brief do not distinguish this case
from the McCormick matter recently decided. The Court's decision in McCormick is dispositive
and the Department's claim against this estate should be allowed.
DATED this}L day of August, 2012,

JJ~
W. cgJMfVCARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
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